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Tardiness of Attorneys as Contempt of Court
Thomas L. Esper*
I. It is the duty of the lawyer not only to his client but also to the courts
and to the public to be punctual in attendance, and to be concise and
direct in the trial and disposition of causes.'
-AfD5-NTESS OF AIT ATTORNEY is ' -ioGa+ion of the fanons -f Professional
Ethics. A continual disregard of the canons of ethics constitutes
misconduct or moral turpitude. Misconduct or moral turpitude are
grounds for disbarment.2
Just as clearly, tardiness of an attorney is punishable as contempt of
court. Contempt of court is viewed as a criminal conviction, since the
contemner is subject to fines and imprisonment. 3 Contempt of court, if
sufficiently repeated, is ground for disbarment. 4
Attorneys, as members of the court, are subject to the courts' in-
herent powers to punish for contempt. Proceedings to punish for con-
tempt may be summary or by trial, depending on whether or not the
absence of the attorney is considered to occur within the presence of the
court or within its personal knowledge. If the attorney's tardiness is
considered to be committed within the presence of the court, he is pun-
ishable summarily for direct contempt. If tardiness is not considered
to occur in the presence of the court, it is viewed an indirect contempt
and notice and a trial are required. Whether the contempt is viewed as
direct or indirect, it is also considered criminal. 5
The classification of the contempt as direct, punishable summarily;
and indirect, with trial required, becomes significant when considering
that in the former the contemner is considered to have waived all his
constitutional safeguards. 6
* B.S. Ohio State University, Third-year Student at Cleveland State University,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
I ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, No. 21.
2 In re Dombey, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 36, 121 N.E. 2d 183 (1954).
3 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S. Ct. 1477 (1968).
4 Ohio Supreme Ct. Rules, Rule XVII (1964).
5 In re Neff, 20 Ohio App. 2d 213, 254 N.E. 2d 25 (1969).
6 Ibid.
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H. A direct contempt consists of something done, or omitted to be done,
in the presence of the court tending to impede or interrupt its pro-
ceedings or reflect upon its integrity. It occurs only when the acts
constituting the contempt have been committed in the presence of
the court...7
The key element of direct contempt is that it must occur in the
presence of the court or so near as to disrupt its proceedings. All the
elements of the contempt are within the personal knowledge of the judge
and he may summarily inflict punishment upon the contemner. The pur-
pose of this summary proceeding is the immediate necessity of vindi-
cating the power and dignity of the court.
A "minority" 8 of jurisdictions (most notably California) hold that
an attorney's absence occurs within the presence of the court. However,
if the contempt is direct but the judge must take testimony from wit-
nesses to establish the contempt, the alleged contemner must receive
notice, even if summary punishment is prescribed. 9 In those jurisdic-
tions holding an attorney's absence to occur in the presence of the court,
tardiness is considered prima facie contemptuous, unless satisfactorily
explained.'0
M. Constructive (indirect) contempt consists of an act done, not in the
presence of the court, but at a distance, which tends to obstruct,
interrupt, prevent, or embarrass the administration of justice, and
which tends to degrade or weaken its authority .. .11
The "majority" 12 of jurisdictions throughout the United States hold
that tardiness of an attorney is an indirect contempt not committed
within the presence of the court. Where this is the position on tardiness,
due process requires that the attorney be given notice and a fair trial.
Indirect contempts are not punishable summarily, since all the elements
of the contempt are not considered to have occurred within the personal
knowledge or in the presence of the court. The rationale behind the
majority position is that "the court cannot ascertain by its own observa-
tion and without inquiry, the operational facts from which an inference
of wilfulness or of a wrongful intent can be drawn." 13
In classifying tardiness as an indirect contempt, the courts are pre-
serving the alleged contemner's constitutional rights to due process. He
7 Dangel, N.L.M. "Contempt" 4 (1939); cf. Blankenburg v. Comm., 272 Mass. 25, sc.
260 Mass. 369.
8 97 A.L.R. 2d 431, 435 (1964).
9 People v. Skar, 30 Ill. 2d 491, 198 N.E. 2d 101 (1964); cf. People v. Sherwin, 334
Ill. 609, 166 N.W. 513 (1929).
10 Supra n. 8.
11 Dangel, N.L.M. "Contempt" 3 (1939).
12 Supra n. 8.
13 Ibid.
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is entitled to notice of trial, right to confront witnesses and cross-
examination. These rights are not afforded the attorney convicted of
direct contempt where summary proceedings are prescribed.
IV. Criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity
and authority of the court, and may occur in either criminal or civil
actions and special proceedings . . .14
Where in a contempt proceeding, the court is prosecuting the con-
dignity of the court and preventing the obstruction of the administration
of justice, in which the accused may be sentenced to pay a fine or to
imprisonment or both, the contempt is criminal in nature.' 5 The Ohio
Revised Code provides a penalty, upon a guilty finding for contempt of
court, of $500.00 and not more than 10 days, or both.'6
Even if contemptuous conduct does not violate provisions of criminal
law, convictions for criminal contempt are indistinguishable from ordi-
nary criminal convictions. 17 Conviction for contempt of court because
of tardiness falls within these cases. The court, in punishing the attor-
ney, is vindicating the authority and dignity of the court. Tardiness does
delay the administration of justice. Those convicted of contempt for
tardiness are subject to fines and imprisonment. Therefore, whether it
is viewed as direct or indirect contempt, it is also viewed as criminal.
V. The power of courts to punish for contempt is independent of legisla-
tion and that which the legislature does not give, it cannot take
away. 18
At common law, courts of justice and legislative assemblies were
deemed to have inherent powers to punish for contempt. 19 This power
is not limited by legislative authority as applied to the courts.2 0 The
various state codes specify acts which constitute contempt and provide
for their punishment, but courts are not limited by these enactments
when vindicating their authority.
While tardiness of an attorney may not be specifically enumerated
in the statutes as contempt of court, courts do have the power to punish
attorneys as officers of the court for causing delays and hampering the
administration of justice. Whether or not the court chooses to exercise
this power is within its discretion. The remainder of this paper is con-
cerned with those cases in which the courts did exercise this power.
14 Dangel, op. cit. supra n. 11, at 3.
15 In re Neff, supra n. 5.
16 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2705.05.
17 Bloom v. Ill., supra n. 3.
18 Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 60 Am. St. Rep. 691, 36 L.R.A. 254 (1896).
'9 8 A.L.R. 1564 (1920); cf. Bloniarz v. Roloson, 74 Cal. Rptr. 285, 449 P. 2d 221(1969).
20 State v. Local Union 5760, 172 Ohio St. 75, 173 N.E. 2d 331 (1961).
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VI. It is obvious that the disruption of judicial proceedings caused, by
the absence of an attorney occurs in the immediate view and pres-
ence of the court.21
That tardiness of an attorney constitutes contempt of court is not
disputed. The only disagreement among the various jurisdictions is
whether tardiness is direct contempt punishable summarily or whether
it is indirect contempt requiring notice and a trial. The conflict in the
states revolves around the interpretation of the phrases "in the immedi-
ate view and presence of the court" and "within the personal official
knowledge of the judge." If it is determined that tardiness occurs within
the presence of the court, the contemner is subject to summary punish-
ment for direct contempt. Alternatively, if tardiness is not deemed to
occur in the presence of the court, it is treated as an indirect or construc-
tive contempt. In the latter event, due process requires that the attorney
be given notice and a fair trial. Where all the elements of the contempt
are within the personal official knowledge of the judge, the attorney may
also be adjudged guilty of contempt.
A recent case advocating the minority position that tardiness is a
direct contempt committed in the presence of the court or within its
personal official knowledge is Kandel v. State.22 The court pointed out
that tardiness of an attorney is misconduct of an officer of the court and
as such may be punished as contempt. Kandel was three hours late in
showing for a trial. The court set out the elements within its personal
knowledge, which included a previous warning about lateness, and pun-
ished Kandel summarily. He was fined $150.00.
In Chula v. Superior Court of L.A. County,23 the attorney was sen-
tenced to four days in jail for not being present for the sentencing of
his client. The court held that the absence of the attorney occurs in the
immediate view and presence of the court and is punishable summarily.
An attorney, who fell asleep in his office and returned 45 minutes
late after a noon recess, was summarily sentenced to imprisonment for
5 twenty-four hour days. (Presumably to catch up on his sleep.)
The court in Lyons v. Superior Court of L.A. County24 held that
the attorney's tardiness occurred in the courts view and presence and
hence constituted a direct contempt punishable summarily. Other Cal-
ifornia cases are all consistent with the above cases in holding that the
attorney's tardiness occurs in the presence of the court or within its
personal knowledge.
25
21 Chula v. Superior Ct. of L. A. County, 57 Cal. 2d 199, 368 P. 2d 107 (1962).
22 252 Md. 668, 250 A. 2d 853 (1969).
23 Supra n. 21.
24 43 Cal. 2d 755, 278 P. 2d 681 (1955).
25 Cantillion v. Superior Ct., 150 Cal. App. 2d 184, 309 P. 2d 890 (1957); Vaughn v.
Municipal Ct. of L.A., 252 Cal. App. 2d 348, 60 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1967); In re Mackey,
140 Cal. App. 400, 35 P. 2d 385 (1934).
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Several New Jersey cases indicate that it is also in the minority
camp. Where both of the opposing counsel in Vincent v. Vincent26 failed
to appear for a habeas corpus hearing, both were summarily fined. The
judge acted on the facts within his personal knowledge in finding them
guilty of direct contempt. Also, In re Clawans27 provides for summary
punishment for tardiness. The attorney was 45 minutes late for an
appeals hearing. She was fined $100.00. The court said that since all of
the attorney's actions were within the personal knowledge of the judge,
was n, denied, due process in finding her guilty of contempt and
punishing her summarily.
Where the tardiness of an attorney is considered to occur in the
presence of the court, and all the elements of the contempt are within
the personal knowledge of the court, the contemner has waived his
right to due process. The court considers that there is an immediate
necessity of inflicting summary punishment to vindicate its authority
or preserve its dignity in punishing the tardy attorney.
On appeal 2 8 the reviewing court is limited to determining whether
there has been an abuse of judicial discretion in setting the fine or im-
prisonment that is disproportionate to the seriousness of the contempt.
29
The appeals courts are reluctant to overturn the summary convictions
of the lower courts since, by definition, the direct contempt elements are
within its personal knowledge and the courts may vindicate their au-
thority and dignity where necessary.
VII. If some essential elements (of contempt of court) are not person-
ally observed by the judge, so that he must depend upon statements
made by others for his knowledge about the essential elements, due
process requires ... that the accused be accorded notice and a fair
hearing. 30
The majority view is that the tardiness of an attorney is an indirect
or constructive contempt. The attorney's absence is not deemed to occur
within the presence of the court, hence notice and a fair trial are re-
quired. In those jurisdictions holding tardiness to be a direct contempt,
but where the judge must depend on statements by others to establish
the contempt, notice is also required. Summary punishment is not pro-
vided in cases of indirect contempt.
26 108 N.J. Eq. 136, 154 A. 328 (1931).
27 69 N.J. Super. 373, 174 A. 2d 367 (1961); see: In Re Newark Teachers Assn., 95
N.J. Super. 117, 230 A. 2d 165, 167 (1967).
28 Chula v. Superior Ct., supra n. 21; In Re McHugh, 152 Mich. 505, 116 N.W. 459
(1908); Appeal of Levine, 372 Pa. 612, 95 A. 2d 222 (1953); Wieland v. Ind. Comm.,
166 Ohio St. 22, 139 N.E. 2d 36 (1956).
29 Wieland v. Ind. Comm., supra n. 28.
30 In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S. Ct. 499 (1948).
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In the case of an indirect contempt, or direct, if all the elements are
not within the personal knowledge of the judge, the contemner is not
considered to have waived his constitutional right to due process. Cooke
v. United States35 requires that one charged with contempt of court be
advised of the charges against him and have a reasonable opportunity to
meet them by way of defense. The only exception to this requirement
is if the misconduct occurs in open court, or in the presence of the judge
and disrupts judicial proceedings. As previously stated, the majority
view is that the attorney's absence does not occur in the presence of the
court; thus, a trial is required.
Typical of the majority position is Weiland v. Commissioner.32 Tar-
diness of an attorney was held to be an indirect contempt in that the
reason for his tardiness could only be ascertained through inquiry. This
court reversed the lower court's summary conviction and fine of $100.00
as an abuse of the trial judge's discretion, stating that the fine was dis-
proportionate to the seriousness of the contempt. The attorney in this
case was 40 minutes late because of automobile trouble. He had called
the court to notify it that he would be late. When he arrived at the
court, he was summarily fined for direct contempt. Weiland v. Com-
missioner33 at least impliedly overrules an earlier Ohio case State ex Tel.
Schroder v. Shay,34 which held tardiness to be a direct contempt. Since
the court could see the attorney was not present, his absence occurred
in the presence of the court.
Knajdek v. West 3 held that conviction of contempt for tardiness is
constructive and criminal in nature and requires due process. The lower
Court had convicted the attorney of contempt and summarily sentenced
him to jail for 60 days. This court reversed stating that failure of an
attorney to appear on time for a trial is an indirect contempt and not
subject to summary proceedings. Minnesota law also provides for a
trial by jury for cases of this nature.
Where an attorney walked out of a trial at adjournment and refused
to return, the court in Klien v. United States3 6 held that the attorney's
absence did not occur in the presence of the court. He was not subject
to summary punishment provided for by 28 USCA § 385. The attorney
returned to New York; the trial was in Washington, D.C.
31 267 U.S. 517, 45 S. Ct. 390 (1925).
32 Supra n. 28.
33 Ibid.
34 3 Ohio N.P. 657, 16 Ohio Dec. 446 (1906).
35 278 Minn. 282, 153 N.W. 2d 846 (1967).
36 8 App. D.C. 106, 151 F. 2d 286 (1945); People v. McDonnell, 337 Ill. 568, 37 N.E. 2d
159 (1941).
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Similarly, in Ex Parte Hill,37 where an attorney was 30 minutes late,
the court said that the attorney's act of contempt was his absence. If the
attorney is absent, the offense does not take place in the presence of the
court. His contempt was indirect and he is entitled to a trial on the
merits of the charge. "If an attorney is absent, his acts are absent."
Tardiness in Re Clark38 was held to be an indirect contempt since it
did not occur in the presence of the court. The court said the attorney's
absence could be explained by innocent circumstances and refused to
uphold the lower court's summary conviction of the attorney.
An attorney, previously sitting in the courtroom, had stepped out
before his case was called. He was summarily fined when he had not
returned by the time the case came up. The court, in State v. Winthrop
39
reversed the summary conviction, holding that an attorney's absence
does not occur in the presence of the court and requires the testimony
of witnesses to establish the contempt. Tardiness or absence is an in-
direct contempt not committed in the presence of the court.
The majority holding, that tardiness is an indirect contempt not
committed in the presence of the court, seems to be the better rule. The
attorney is being punished for his absence, and it seems a logical in-
consistency to say that his absence occurs in the presence of the court.
Summary punishment deprives the alleged contemner the protection of
the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the constitution of the United
States. 40 While some jurisdictions provide for the attorney to present
exculpatory reasons for his absence by supporting affidavit, which may
or may not be acceptable, the fact remains that with the minority view
the contemner is considered to have waived all these constitutional safe-
guards. Agreeing with Re Clark,41 that the attorney's absence could be
explained by innocent circumstance, the majority opinion on tardiness is
more readily acceptable.
Conclusion
Misconduct shall mean any violation of any provision of the oath of
office taken upon admission to the practice of law in this state, or
any violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics or the Canons of
Judicial Ethics as adopted by the court from time to time, . . . , or
the commission or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
(Emphasis added.) 42
37 122 Tex. 80, 52 S.W. 2d 367 (1932).
38 208 Mo. 121, 106 S.W. 990 (1907).
39 148 Wash. 526, 269 P. 793 (1928).
40 U.S. Const. Amend. V. A person may not be compelled to be a witness against
himself, nor may he be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process.
Amend. VI. Inter Alia: Right to a speedy trial; notice of the charge; right of cross-
examination and right to counsel. Amend. XIV. Requirement of due process and
equal protection of the law.
41 208 Mo. 121, 106 S.W. 990 (1907).
42 Ohio Supreme Ct. Rules, Rule XVII (1964).
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In defending the opening statements, that tardiness of an attorney
may constitute grounds for disbarment, be it for contempt of court con-
viction or violation of the canons of ethics, one has only to look to Rule
XVII of the Ohio Supreme Court Rules on disciplinary procedures to
appreciate the consequences of tardiness. Canon 21 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics clearly requires punctuality in attendance. Rule
XVIII § 4, setting out the authority of local and state bar committees
states:
Any State Bar Association shall investigate any matter referred to
it or which comes to its attention, and may cause a complaint to be
filed pursuant to this rule in cases where misconduct, contempt, or
mental illness is found; . . . (Emphasis added.) 43
The board, upon consideration of its findings, may recommend to the
Supreme Court that the attorney be reprimanded, suspended, or dis-
barred. The Supreme Court has inherent power to discipline attorneys.44
The Attorney contemner is open to disciplinary proceedings on two
fronts. Each is sufficient for bar committees to consider disciplinary
action. Granting that an occasional tardiness or one contempt conviction
for tardiness should not be grounds for disbarment, there are other dis-
ciplinary measures available that are less severe but, which if employed,
would point out to the offender the seriousness of his lack of punctuality
or respect toward the court. Recognizing that infractions or convictions
which have come to their attention through the courts or otherwise are
compiled by local bar associations, habitual offenders can easily be de-
tected and complaints issued.
Although there are relatively few reported cases on tardiness of
attorneys as contempt of court, they are unanimous in their holdings.
There may be disagreement as to whether it is direct or indirect con-
tempt, but there is no disagreement that tardiness of an attorney is
contempt.
43 Id., § 4.
44 Mahoning County Bar v. Franko, 169 Ohio St. 17, 50 Ohio Ops. 2d 282, 151 N.E. 2d
17 (1958).
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